Greg Sanders

Next America Repost: Defense-Industry Haikus

In a silly experiment, with help from Matt Zlatnik, I present the following seven haikus inspired by defense-related newsletters. There’s a bit of a contest involved with these with a prize of a Lockheed Martin toiletries kit, see the Next America page for details.

Private security
Cost six billion through ‘09
More in subcontracts

Big 3Q spend bump
The supplement arrived late
Not conspiracy

Cost-plus contracting
Now buys many more services
McCain not pleased

Six hundred million 
Meant for small businesses 
Went to the big boys

Europe does research 
But Americans sell stuff
Thank you big budget!

Big helicopter 
Spend lots on fancy add-ons
Save the President!

Large trade surpluses
Show the U.S. still produces
When it comes to arms

Again, go here for the source newsletters.

This entry also available at CSIS’s Next America Blog.

Afghanistan's Future: Colombia? Vietnam? Pakistan? Lebanon? Afghanistan's past?

As the administration works to formulate a new strategy for Afghanistan, popular and elite support appears to be dropping off and a string of attacks makes the stakes all too clear.

Dichotomies such as counter-insurgency versus counterterrorism, double down or fold, are useful ways to try to force prioritization rather than allow inertia to set strategy.  However, they preclude options that would vary the approach based on the region.  Another, still overly simple, way to look at Afghanistan is by comparing possible end states.

Colombia: The U.S. has had mixed success is strengthening the government of Colombia and cracking down on cocaine cultivation.  However, mirroring Colombia's achievements would still be a boon to Afghanistan while still being a more realistic end-state than the mountainous and decentralized democracy of Switzerland.  Getting to Colombia in the mid-term would likely require a counterinsurgency approach and a substantial increase in resources and improvements in governance.

Vietnam: Joshua Kurlantzick raises Vietnam as a positive model of an end state. Namely after the withdrawal and the fall of South Vietnam, while the country is still authoritarian, the U.S. enjoys a close relationship with that country and the long-feared domino effect never occurred.   Whether a successor of the current government or the Taliban is in charge, the question of terrorist havens must be addressed.  However, that issues is by no means limited to Afghanistan.

Pakistan: Through the use of Predator drones support by good intel, the U.S. has been quite successful at targeting Al Qaeda leadership without a large scale military presence on the ground.   Austin Long discusses how such an approach could be applied in Afghanistan (via Michael Cohen).  On the one hand, civilian casualties from drone strike do raise tensions, on the other, many of the civilian deaths from airstrikes were a result of missiles and bombs being used to provide support to U.S. combat troops.  The experience in Pakistan shows that these target strikes alone will not defeat the Taliban, but may achieve the narrower objective of crippling Al Qaeda.  Implementing this strategy in the short-term should be manageable, but the sustainability, either in Afghanistan or Pakistan, is an open question.

Lebanon: According to Scott Wilson, one train of thought emerging in the Administration is that we attempt to weaken but not destroy the Taliban.  The analogy would be Hezbollah, which controls a portion of Lebanon and participates in its government as a minority party.  There is a risk that allowing this would destabilize Pakistan, but on the other hand the relationship between Pakistan and the Taliban has often been far friendlier than the relationship between Hezbollah and Israel.  Such an approach could be population-centric in government strongholds while reserving the counter-terrorism for any Al Qaeda activity in the remainder of the country.

Afghanistan's Past: A way to pursue counter-insurgency with less troops would be to exclusively defend the cities.  As Matt Yglesias notes, this approach in some way mirrors the Soviet approach in the latter stages of their occupation, though of course would not seek to emulate many soviet methods.  The Soviet approach may be a subset of the Lebanon approach, the difference would be that a cities approach would pick key population centers nation-wide while a more Lebanon-like approach may abandon some larger population centers in Taliban sympathizing territory while protecting smaller but more sympathetic locales.

Successful pursuit of a strategy in a hostile environment typically requires providing a sufficient level of resources and sacrificing desirable objects that are not necessary for success.  More ambitious approaches require far more resources which will further tax the U.S. economy.  Less ambitious approaches, up to and including withdrawal, will not accomplish everything we would like to see happen in Afghanistan, but may prove the most efficient way to advance U.S. interests and values.  As the Status of Forces agreement in Iraq showed, these choices will be further limited by what the local politicians and population will support, but for such a negotiation to be practical we need to first determine what we are shooting for.

While determining the cost in casualties of any of these strategies is quite difficult, the cost in dollars is easier to estimate.  So, reader, do you think this is a good starting list?  Are there any other end-states to be considered?

This post is also available at ameasureofsecurity.org and Next America.

Belfast Black Taxi - Political Tour July 10, 2009

To my surprise, we were actually in Belfast shortly before the Orangemen march.  That’s the time when a group of Unionists (Protestants who want to stay in the UK) do their traditional march celebrating the a victory of William of Orange in Ireland.  As a side note, Orange was his color because he was from Holland, he was the Norman that conquered the UK.  This march goes through a Catholic neighborhood and thus tends to direct clashes.  The controversy over the march, and the larger marching season, is a symptom of sectarian conflict and not a root cause, but it does make for good news stories. 

The tour, done in the back of a black taxi that Belfast is known for, got into the deeper issues.  Here’s wikipedia’s full summary of the Troubles.  A short version is that Catholics were a minority in Northern Ireland and often discriminated against.  The British army was actually sent in to protect them around 1970 but ended up throwing oil on the fire at Bloody Sunday in (London)Derry when protesters were shot.  Civilians were killed by partisans and security forces had happened prior to that point, but that was when the bombing campaign got going.  In Belfast the center of the conflict was in two polarized neighborhoods in the West part of the city that were immediately adjacent to one another.  The tour went through both of them, pictures on the Loyalist side first.

The square at the start is a march staging area.  It’s surrounded by murals, some historical, some focusing on paramilitary (including terrorist) leaders, and a few that are harder to characterize. 

Next stop was the “Peace wall” between the two communities.  There were multiple gates with no checkpoints, though they would be closed in the evening.  Similarly getting around the wall wouldn’t be hard at all.  Instead, it serves to force anyone seeking to cause trouble to go through a few chokepoints, throw things over the wall at the caged backyards on the far side, or travel outside of their strongholds before or after an attack.  While the Good Friday peace accord has been in place for around a decade now, our driver, Tom, didn’t think the wall would be going away anytime soon.  I think he’s probably right.  Walls do a good job of providing protection but they also calcify lines of division.  You can’t attack as easily but nor can you intermingle.

The ones that came later on the Catholic side were more recognizable as appeals for legitimacy or agitation regarding other conflicts.  The most interesting one for me was the mural of Bobby Sands, who was an IRA leader that the leadership managed to get himself elected as an MP while he was in prison.  He subsequently died on hunger strike as part of an attempt to get IRA prisoners treated as political prisoners/P.O.W.s.  Apparently he’s still a contested symbol between those in the IRA that compromised and breakaway hardliners, but I think the mural we saw was firmly in the mainline camp.  On the Catholic side there we’d also seen a remembrance garden listing the IRA and civilian dead from the Troubles.  Though there were certainly dead on the Unionist side, we didn’t see any of such shrines, so I’m not sure how they’d be different.

On the whole, the Black Taxi tour was well worth doing at 25 pounds for two people.  As an added bonus we got dropped off over at Queen’s university setting up our dinner and walk for the evening.

Talk Like a Modern Pirate Day

See here. Reading Medium Large? If not you should.

Second hand battleships

One of the reasons some U.S. aid may have been turned away by the Burmese government is that some of the assistance would come from warships. The U.S. Navy has a lot of capacity to do good, but even smaller detachment of ships still could pack a serious punch. We do have strictly hospital ships, such as the USNS Mercy shown below, but they’re only part of our response capability. One possible solution, suggested my friend and colleague Bryan Shea, might be to transfer some older ships to the State Department rather than selling or simply decommissioning them.’

The idea would face complications. To be effective the ship(s) would probably need to be forward deployed, perhaps combining aid with public diplomacy when there isn’t a disaster to respond to. Piracy can be a real issue in southeast Asia and aid teams often are targeted by spoilers or those simply seeking to rob them. An old nuclear carrier would have the advantage of fast movement but would raise a whole new class of concerns. But ultimately for our civilian agencies to be effective they must be in the field, and for large parts of the world, the field can be the oceans.

Image taken by Telstar Logistics and used under a Creative Commons license.

What to do about Burma?

It’s about month since Cyclone Nargis hit. The Burmese government has consistently failed their people with 2.4 million still homeless. More aid was allowed in after the government conducted its unfair and unfree constitutional referendum in the week following the quake. Near as I understand it, some U.S. aid is allowed in, but the aid workers who can actually operate in the country largely have to be from Asian countries. Given the severe limits on aid, from most of the world, I think it’s safe to say that initial harsh U.S. comments might not have made the difference in terms of access and were certainly well deserved. Sullivan has a link with pictures.

There are some, such as George Packer, that consider intervention. I don’t think anyone is arguing for a full on invasion, but instead sending in naval ships that have a proven record when it comes to disaster relief. Sadly, it would probably take ships or landing aircraft, as the PCR project points out airdrops can’t really be effective in this sort of situation.

I’d oppose a naval intervention, the Burmese government is made up of paranoiacs with no interest above maintaining power, they would escalate and a limited intervention would not stay limited. At the same time they’d likely cut off humanitarian access to those countries they’ve allowed in. Moreover, gross negligence in disaster response, while evil, doesn’t rise to the level of genocide. At the same time, setting aside China’s active opposition, we don’t have the support of democratic regional powers such as India or Indonesia.

However, as Matt Yglesias notes there are many opportunities, such as non-coercive relief opportunities in Sudan, where aid could help deal with disasters. We’d do well to gain experience by taking these opportunities that would give valuable experience. We actually handled the tsunami pretty well, but often have difficulty dealing with the other parts of a failed state even when we do have U.N. support. Learning to get better at that and developing a track record of success would much improve our performance and ability to gain support when coercion might be appropriate.

Image taken by groundreporter and used under a creative commons license.

Review: Heads in the Sand by Matt Yglesias

In his usual easy to read and witty style, Matthew Yglesias in his book Heads in the Sand addresses an issue that has long reverberated around the blogosphere.

*Q:* Why did the Democratic party keep losing to President Bush on foreign policy issues even under favorable conditions? *A:* Because it didn’t offer a coherent alternative.

Yglesias justifies a book length answer by providing a history of both the politics and the policy. His preferred alternative is classical liberal internationalism, an attempt to slowly progress towards a rule-based international system. This ideology dates back to Woodrow Wilson but was first implemented with any success under FDR. Containment, deterrence, and the first Gulf War were all compatible with this idea while pre-emptive war is dramatically opposed to it.

Support for this world view began to breakdown during the 1990s as some liberals, including myself, grew frustrated with the failures of the international community to prevent genocides in Bosnia and Rwanda. For the war in Kosovo the U.S. skirted U.N. approval and instead went to Nato to get multilateral support. After 9/11 key liberal hawks started treating a rule-based order as an instrument rather than a goal, pursuing international support was wise but even if the U.N. or a major regional organization did not sign on, a pre-emptive war could still be justified.

Yglesias argues that in 2002 and 2004 Democrats often sought to neutralize foreign policy issues either by supporting the President’s policies, critiquing on their implementation, or by pinning our hopes on military veteran candidates. By 2006 Democratic opponents of the war were finally in ascendancy but many liberals in the foreign policy community and the press still hew to the hawk line. Despite popular support for withdraw, Congress has been repeatedly thwarted in part because they have focused on tactical critiques rather than strategic ones. Since tactics and implementation are easy to change, and in some cases have changed for the better, the administration has consistently been able to out maneuver that charge. It may prove even weaker against John McCain who has supported many administration policies but still will have an easier time isolating himself from the President’s personal incompetence.

More after the cut

If I were a betting man

Well, PN Maliki’s make-or-break offensive is still rolling along. Sadr’s supporters have turned out thousands of protestors.

See Kevin Drum for other theories on PM Maliki’s motivation. He also provides a terrific cheat sheet for telling the Shiite factions apart. This is useful because they ofteen go by many names.

There’s a lot of other good material out there, but I’m kinda sleepy after a big meal and a bunch of wedding planning work.

So I’ll just say this. My money is on Sadr winning this round. Massive offensives are a highly questionable counter-insurgency tool. The fact that Sadr’s ceasefire did substantially clamp down on the violence leads me to believe he’s got a pretty well controlled and disciplined militia, "special groups" not withstanding.

More specifically, I think they’ll be an inconclusive outcome, Sadr’s people will probably get a few nice PR victories, and Maliki’s credibility will be greatly diminished. That said, I’m just going off what’s in the newspapers.

Maryland Polls staying open until 9:30

Good, the voters could use the time. It’s pretty miserable out there. Take care. The precipitation wasn’t that bad but the sidewalks were really icy. Not sure how the roads were, local ones I drove on weren’t that bad.

My sympathy to the judges (and my Mom who acts as an observer and will now be up an extra hour and a half).

Restaurant Review: Bamian

Last night I got dinner at Bamian and missed the Democratic debate. I kind wanted to catch that one, so I’ll see if I can find the whole thing online.

For now though, here’s a review, Bamian is a terrific Afghan restaurant in Falls Church. The atmosphere is nice if not amazing, the location not that terrific, you will have to drive or take a bus from a nearby Metro stop. However, the food is wonderful!

Anyways, the place was recommended to me by my Program head when I’d made an Afghan dish for a work function. Specifically he’d recommended the Aushak (dumplings) as an appetizer and Qaubili Palau (rice, lamb, carrots, and more) and Kadu Chalau (pumpkin with home made yogurt which was the dish I’d prepared).

So I had the Aushak and it was good, my friend had the Kabob Gosfand and liked it as well. I didn’t get the chance to do the Kadu Chalau this time, but will have to try it when I get back.

But, primarily, I am here today to praise the Qaubili Palau. (For the record, I think Qaubili os a different transliteration of the Afghan capital). The lamb was good but the rice, sweet carrots, and raisins (I think there was also some cinnamon) were perfectly blended and tasted incredible in combination. I’m a rice lover but typically I’m not even a fan of raisins in most contexts. The carrot preparation was particularly neat, they made carrot strips, I’m guessing with a peeler, and then just spread them over the top of the rice.

Other notes. MY friend was disappointed with the black chai, the green was alright, but based on the waitresses reaction I don’t think they specialize in either. I thought the bread was okay, I’ve heard they have great bread available, but maybe that’s something you can order extra. And, these dishes are pretty big, so unless you’ve got a large group you probably won’t need lots of extra bread. Large group with lots of trading is probably the best way to enjoy this place, but the two of us were still quite happy.

Group picture from the Bamian website. I’m guessing they won’t complain since I’m giving them a good review.

Intel Czar says waterboarding is torture and yet we don't torture

Yglesias among others caught this:

Am I reading this right? Intel czar Michael McConnell thinks waterboarding would be torture but no waterboarding that was actually done was torture, because torture is a crime and so that would mean that the people who ordered waterboarding (i.e., his bosses) are criminals. But what does this mean? If it’s torture, it’s torture.

So we’ve learned from past experience that this administration can be very careful with wording. Saying things that are highly misleading but technically true. Obviously there’s outright lies too, such as "We don’t torture." But I’m guessing McConnell is attempting to slowly improve U.S. policy while at the same time not getting caught in a lie. Here’s the quote:

"Waterboarding would be excruciating," the US director of national security, in overall charge of intelligence, said in the interview in the New Yorker magazine, speaking of the simulated drowning technique that many regard as torture.

"If I had water draining into my nose, oh God, I just can’t imagine how painful! Whether it’s torture by anybody else’s definition, for me it would be torture," he said.

When asked to define torture, McConnell replied: "My own definition of torture is something that would cause excruciating pain...."

But he told the magazine flatly: "We don’t torture."

Waterboarding involves pouring water over the covered mouth of a suspect, creating a sensation of drowning.

So, what’s the distinction? Well, the wikipedia article on waterboarding goes into some detail about the technique. The main source of variety seems to be whether the mouth and/or nose are covered. An ABC News report describes the technique thusly:

Water Boarding: The prisoner is bound to an inclined board, feet raised and head slightly below the feet. Cellophane is wrapped over the prisoner’s face and water is poured over him. Unavoidably, the gag reflex kicks in and a terrifying fear of drowning leads to almost instant pleas to bring the treatment to a halt.

So, out on a limb here. I don’t have any special sources, I’m just assuming McConnell has picked his words very carefully. Perhaps the cellophane keeps water from dripping into the nose. I think the drowning effect would still happen just from having your breathing passages covered and feeling the water pouring over the covering. So, since the water doesn’t technically enter the breathing passages, I’m guessing the administration would argue that the suffering is psychological and not physical so it doesn’t count. Hence the emphasis on "excruciating pain" in McConnell’s statement.

So, would that actually be true? Well, let’s consult the UN Convention against Torture (which the US has ratified):

the term "torture" means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession...

Yup, mental pain is covered. So, if there’s those with more expertise on the specifics of the technique, feel free to correct me about whether this dodge makes sense. But, for now, this is my best guess as to the future propaganda we’ll be hearing.