The current president is claiming victory and has the backing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei which means the backing of Iran’s primary power source. The Washington Post has pictures of the resulting protests. My basis for fairly confidentially declaring this a theft is that it also appears to be an inept theft (although according to Nate Silver, the quantitative argument doesn’t sufficient prove much; I somehow overlooked that originally, but Tosk59 over on Kevin Drum’s comments noted it).
Instead, the argument rests on the margin of victory being rather high for a closely contested election and Juan Cole (via Kevin Drum) has pointed out a range of large inconsistencies. Notably Ahmadinejad’s support was fairly uniform nation-wide and including winning cities were the opposition was getting the most support. I could have believed, albeit been disappointed by, an Ahmadinejad victory. The western press does tend to play up urban areas and opposition. But I do have some sense what losing an election looks like and this isn’t it. Heck, I’m even familiar with what a election that comes beneath the margin of error and is then stolen looks like, I don’t think Ahmadinejad even got that.
Juan Cole has a very plausible sounding analysis of what went down:
The [Interior] ministry must have informed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who has had a feud with Mousavi for over 30 years, who found this outcome unsupportable. And, apparently, he and other top leaders had been so confident of an Ahmadinejad win that they had made no contingency plans for what to do if he looked as though he would lose.
They therefore sent blanket instructions to the Electoral Commission to falsify the vote counts.
This clumsy cover-up then produced the incredible result of an Ahmadinejad landlside in Tabriz and Isfahan and Tehran.
The reason for which Rezaie and Karoubi had to be assigned such implausibly low totals was to make sure Ahmadinejad got over 51% of the vote and thus avoid a run-off between him and Mousavi next Friday, which would have given the Mousavi camp a chance to attempt to rally the public and forestall further tampering with the election.
Will the protesters be successful and achieve a ‘velvet’ revolution? I would suspect not. Iran isn’t in Europe where surrounding great powers counterbalance the force of the government. Similarly, the regime’s grip on the instruments of violence is quite tight and Ahmadinejad’s younger followers are often paramilitary types. That said, I wonder if the sheer number of young people in Iran, unlike China which had a one child policy. Another difference with Tiananmen is that the revolutionary generation is still split. Some of those that helped bring down the Shah, including Mousavi. That said, I haven’t seen evidence that the protests are highly effectively organized or capable of storming government buildings or the like. That said, Cole argues that this will be a blow to the regime’s legitimacy and I don’t think they’re in a good position
So as for the U.S. role? Keep the political pressure up, but there’s not that much we can do. If the opposition could actually win some real battles, in the literal sense of the term, against the current regime than I’d be willing to support some level of intervention that didn’t involve occupation. But I suspect that won’t happen and we should promise nothing lest Iran be added to post-Gulf War Iraq and Hungary as uprisings we encouraged and then, for likely-wise pragmatic reasons, betrayed. I do still support engagement with Iran, but I also supported engagement with Libya where there was never really a pretense of democracy. That said, this puts an upper bound on the closeness of our ties even with recognition.
[Update: Fixed grammar error in title.]
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