Intro by Tony Cordesman, uptick in Iraq violence, still more violence in casualties than in Afghanistan. Do not measure violence in terms of killed, casualties are killed and wounded because it tends to disguise trends.
Gary Langer, ABC’s director of polling with D3 Systems/KA Research Ltd. The poll found dramatic improvements in public attitudes across a range of measures. Sample size: 2,228 with 446 sampling points. By comparison, the Hopkins Lancet survey with the high casualty count only had 47 sample points. They give more detail on their methods which seem quite robust to me but is a bit over my head. 67% cooperation rate which is higher than the U.S. but lower than their Afghanistan polls. Iraqis interviewing Iraqis which lets them get
Roots of the change is security. Low in March 2007, level in August with improvements on an individually level. Much better for February 2008 and February 2009. Suicide attacks are the form of attack people have the most experience with. Only area where things have degraded is Anbar. Local services and conditions have improved, but aren’t yet to pre-violence 2005 levels; fuel has the greatest improvement. Confidence in national government is at a new high as is the support for Democracy at 64% (although not getting a majority of Sunni Arab support). Support for Islamic state is relatively stable at 19% has for the first time overtaken the support for a strong leader at 14%.
Maliki has been gaining support among his base in Shiites, increase in Sunnis to 31%, but Kurds have dropped to 51% despite prior stronger support. That said, even Shiite Arabs are concerned that Maliki is consolidating too much power. Even so, there’s not a great deal of confidence in the Council of Representatives with the least support among Sunnis.
Interestingly, if the ABC polling is accurate, Shiites Arabs are just 49% of the population and not the 60-65% classic CIA/LoC sources have said but there’s no source for the numbers. Kurds are still around 16% which is standard and non-Muslims at 4%. The dramatic change is that Sunni Arabs come in around 31% of the population. This means that the standard measures might overestimate Shiite Arab vs. Sunni Arab population by 10 percentage points!
In general, Sunni’s still lag in the positive ratings of the situation, but have been dramatically increasing sometimes to the extent of doubling. The prior strong support of Kurds remains above the Sunnis but is leveling off and now sometimes dropping below Arab Shiites levels. That said, Kurds still feel very safe in their neighborhoods and able to live where they wish without prosecution. When it comes specifically to services, it appears that the dramatic improvements are coming from the Arab Shiites. There’s been some suggestion that this was a boost targeted at majority Arab Shiite provinces in an attempt to win votes.
There is evidence of increasing ethnic separation with 62% in Baghdad and 75% in the rest of Iraq living in neighborhoods dominated by one sectarian group. They estimate the population of Baghdad down to 30% with others estimating it’s gone as low as 15%. But as the number above shows that this is not a Baghdad only phenomenon. Fewer friends across doctrinal lines Sunni/Shiite relations are rated positively in homogenous neighborhoods but negatively in heterogeneous neighborhoods. While the vast majority of the country prefers a strong central government, 39% of Kurds favor a confederate government and another 39% favor full separation.
Even so, 56% of Iraqis opposed the invasion with a small increase since 2008. Kurds highly supportive, Sunni Arabs opposed, and the Shiite Arabs becoming a bit more opposed perhaps as they’re more confident that they aren’t dependent on American power. Although negative ratings of the U.S. and Britain are dropping and are now below the negative ratings of Iran. In terms of withdrawal 35% current time table (2011), 46% leave sooner, 16% stay longer. Based on that question it does sound like the Status of Forces Agreement could be ratified by a majority vote, although it would be a near thing.
I wouldn’t have been able to guess the specific numbers, but most of this information is in line with what I expected. The main surprise was that the standard demographic profile might be dramatically off. This does suggest that Sunni-Shiite Arab reconciliation is all the more vital for the stability of the country. I’m most depressed at the level of the ethnic cleansing and the extent that this ethnic separation seems to be a key driver of security perceptions. One other fascinating point, security has a weaker effect on confidence with the national government that development, but I’d guess that they may be holding the U.S. and not the national government culpable for security problems.
Here’s the charts for the data itself.
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